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PREFACE
This report analyses the reasons for European policy-makers coming to perceive 
the Sahel as a threat to Europe’s own security and stability. It starts by presenting 
the most recent developments in the Sahel and Maghreb regions in respect of the 
two most significant threats to European security and stability: trans-national 
jihadism and cross-border migration. The report provides in-depth analysis of a 
series of the most important factors that are driving the increases in jihadism and 
migration, including the persistence of state weakness in the Sahel, the collapse of 
the state in Libya and the failure of regional collaboration. Furthermore, the report 
analyses the most significant developments in the international community’s 
responses to the most recent conflicts and crises in the Sahel and Maghreb, 
including the foreign policies of France, which remains the single most important 
foreign actor in the Sahel, the European Union and Denmark. The report closes with 
a series of suggestions regarding how the European powers, especially Denmark, 
might adjust their policies in order to increase the likelihood of long-term peace and 
stability being generated in the region. 
The report argues that, although European powers spearheaded by France have 
succeeded in reducing a number of the most immediate threats to the survival of 
states and societies in some of the most vulnerable parts of the Sahel, in particular 
in northern Mali, the international community has failed to generate the conditions 
that would foster long-term peace and development. As a consequence, the report 
suggests that the European powers should look for ways to inject life into the 
strategic objective of bringing the North African powers into play when attempting 
to solve the crisis in the Sahel. This is not an easy task, since collaboration between 
regional powers like Algeria and Morocco continues to be hampered by their 
competition for regional hegemony. Nonetheless it will be necessary to embark on 
this path if long-term solutions to the threats and challenges emerging in the Sahel 
are to be adequately addressed and peace and stability restored in the long run. 
Recognizing that the European great powers must be involved in the process if it is 
to work, the report suggests that Denmark, as a small North European power 
without a colonial past in the region, should consider taking up the role of a facilitator 
of increased trans-regional integration between the Sahel and the Maghreb. Any 
such move would be aided by Denmark’s strong development portfolio in the Sahel, 
as well as its steadily growing presence in North Africa and its current support to 
anti-terrorism, stabilization and development in the region. 
The analysis contained in the report is based on insights generated by the work of 
the Sahel-Maghreb Research Platform. The Platform was financed by the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented as a joint venture between the host 
institution, the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), and Voluntas 
Advisory. Initiated in November 2016 and finalized in March 2018, the Platform is 
coordinated by Rasmus Alenius Boserup, Senior Researcher at DIIS, and Luis 
Martinez, Research Director at Sciences Po. 
Besides desk studies conducted in Copenhagen and Paris, the report draws on 
insights generated during a series of research, policy and dissemination activities. 
These include six public expert seminars and conferences held in Copenhagen, 
Dakar and Bamako, four closed policy-oriented round tables with experts and policy-
makers convened at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen, four 
closed research seminars held at the Danish Institute for International Studies, and 
a dozen debriefings and advisory sessions held between experts and decision-
makers at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Danish embassies 
in Bamako and Ouagadougou. It also draws on insights presented in twelve un-
published policy notes authored by experts affiliated to the Platform, four 
unpublished policy reports destined for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, four published 
policy briefs, and three opinion and analysis pieces placed in Danish national 
newspapers. 
The authors of this report and academic coordinators of the Platform would like to 
thank the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for generously funding the Sahel-
Maghreb Research Platform. We would also like to thank the scholars involved in 
the Platform for sharing their analyses and ideas with a host of different audiences, 
ranging from peers to policy-makers and the general public. In particular, we would 
like to thank Hans Lucht, Senior Researcher at DIIS and expert in trans-Saharan 
migration, and Signe Cold Ravnkilde, Post-doctoral Researcher at DIIS and expert in 
state-building in Mali. We would also like to thank Abdenour Benantar, Université 
Paris VII, France; Mohamed Ben Lamma, Bani Walid University, Libya; Anouar 
Boukhars, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, USA; Ladiba Gondeu, University of 
N’Djamena, Chad; Mohammed Eljarh, Atlantic Council; Jean-Hervé Jezequel, 
International Crisis Group, Dakar; Cédric Jourde, University of Ottawa, Canada; Djallil 
Lounnas, Al-Akhawayn University, Morocco; Lémine Ould Mohamed Salem; Zakaria 
Ould Salem, Université de Noukachott, Mauritania; Bakary Sambé, Timbuktou 
Institute in Dakar, Senegal. Furthermore, we would like to thank all those we met 
during our fieldwork missions in the Sahel, in particular Boukary Sangare from the 
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Over the past decade, European powers have come to perceive the deteriorating 
security situation in the Sahel region as a threat. Seen from Europe, the Sahel – the 
semi-arid band that stretches across Africa from the Atlantic coast of southern 
Mauritania and northern Senegal through northern Mali and Niger, southern Algeria 
and Libya and parts of Chad until it reaches the Indian Ocean on the Sudanese coast 
– has come to represent a series of security concerns for two reasons. First, there 
is the rapid spread of jihadist groups into the region, who, besides fighting to destroy 
state governments in the Sahel, also regard the European powers as their enemies. 
Secondly, there is the increasing pressure of cross-border migration from and 
through the Sahel region towards Europe.
In part due to its own policies of intervening militarily in Libya 
and Mali, Europe has also become an increasingly important 
target and destination for these non-state actors.
Treating jihadism and migration as European security concerns obviously risks 
distorting the picture of what is happening on the ground in the Sahel. Numerous 
studies have shown that jihadists in the Sahel (as elsewhere in the world) are 
primarily targeting representatives of the states and societies within the Sahel 
region itself. In the same way, traditional migration patterns in the Sahel have 
targeted North and Central African countries: about two-thirds of all migration in 
Africa remains within Africa. 
Sahel: 
A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERN 
University of Leiden and the Danish Embassy in Bamako, and  Aly Tounkara from 
the University of Dakar, who on several occasions have both generously shared their 
analyses of the situation in the Sahel and the Maghreb. 
Finally, we would like to thank the Danish Institute for International Studies for 
hosting the project, and Voluntas Advisory, in particular Jakob Wichmann, Alexander 
Kjaerum and Hannah Linnemann, for making the project happen through their 
professional research and administrative support. 
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However, in part due to its own policies of intervening militarily in Libya and Mali, 
Europe has also become an increasingly important target and destination for these 
non-state actors. Indeed, countries like France today consider jihadism in the Sahel 
to be a key challenge to their own security, and European-supported UN peacekeeping 
officers in the region have come under increasing attack from jihadists. Likewise, 
Italy, together with most other European countries, has placed anti-migration 
policies at the core of its foreign policy in Libya, the Maghreb and the Sahel. 
Cross-Border Migration to Europe
Cross-border migration between the Sahel and the Maghreb is not a new pheno-
menon. Indeed, since pre-colonial times people have crossed the Sahara looking for 
economic and other opportunities, and historians typically point out the deeply 
rooted nature of “informal”, “seasonal” or “circular” cross-border migration during the 
colonial era, both within the Sahel and between it and the Maghreb.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects a six-fold  
increase in migration from Africa to OECD countries, primarily 
Europe, in the coming decades.  
However, as Ali Bensaad has pointed out, trans-regional migration between the 
Sahel and the Maghreb began to increase considerably in the post-colonial period 
as the thinly populated Algerian and Libyan deserts were developed for oil and 
gas exploitation with a labour force consisting primarily of workers from the 
Sahel.1 During the 1960s and 1970s, desert villages of a few thousand inhabitants, 
like Tamanrasset in southern Algeria or Sebha in southern Libya, would increase 
their populations considerably through the influx of informal Sub-Saharan labour 
migrants. The same was the case for cities in the Sahel, where states and multi-
national companies established exploitation sites like Arlit in Niger, which provided 
services to uranium mining and grew from eight thousand inhabitants to more than 
a hundred thousand a few years later. This was primarily due to seasonal migrant 
workers employed in the service businesses surging around the uranium production 
sites.
Due to this development of the desert, in the early 2000s it was estimated that 
about one and a half million sub-Saharan migrants were living in Libya, about 
300,000 in Mauritania, as many in Algeria, and a couple of tens of thousands in 
Tunisia and Morocco, while about a hundred thousand others would pass through 
Agadez in Niger each year as part of the seasonal pattern of labour migration.2
The large part of that labour force would remain in the Maghreb. However, from the 
early 2000s a small, but significant number of sub-Saharan migrants began seeking 
to move further through the Maghreb towards Europe. During the 2000s, these early 
traces of the current migration patterns of sub-Saharan labour migrants across the 
Mediterranean would continue to represent a small minority of the total number of 
migrants crossing into Europe, with North Africans – primarily Algerians and 
Moroccans – figuring most prominently statistically. In 2000, for instance, it was 
estimated that eleven times more Moroccans were crossing into Spain than sub-
Saharan Africans of all nationalities put together.3
Besides the shock effects of the 2015 “refugee crisis” in Europe, there are two key 
reasons why migration from Sub-Saharan Africa has become a major concern for 
European policy-makers over the past three years. 
The first reason is connected with demographic and economic projections for Sub-
Saharan Africa. The significant population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, including 
the Sahel region, represents a massive challenge not only for Africa’s economies, 
but also, from a migration perspective, for Europe. Africa’s population is expected to 
grow from about 900 million in 2013 to about 2.8 billion by 2060. Moreover, the 
working-age population that usually comprises migration flows is forecast to grow 
even more rapidly, from about 480 million in 2013 to 1.3 billion in 2050. Although 70 
per cent of African migration still takes place within the African continent, this 
development will arguably increase the migration pressure on the more developed 
economies.4 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) thus expects a six-fold increase 
in migration from Africa to OECD countries, primarily Europe, in the coming decades. 
The second reason for migration becoming a key concern for Europe is the latter’s 
inability to close its borders with the Maghreb in the wake of the collapse of Libya. 
Indeed, the collapse of the Libyan economy following Gaddafi’s fall in the summer of 
2011 simultaneously deprived the country’s labour migrants of one of their most 
prosperous job markets in Africa and allowed human smugglers to expand their 
transportation of sub-Saharan migrants to southern European shores considerably, 
notably towards Italy.
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Taken together, these developments have put the issue of migration from and 
through the Sahel high on the European policy agenda. As we shall see later, this has 
prompted the EU and its member states to initiate a series of anti-migration policies 
targeting the Sahel. 
The Spread of Jihadism
Compared to trans-regional migration between Sahel and the Maghreb, the spread 
of jihadism into the Sahel region is a relatively new phenomenon dating back only to 
the late 1990s. The jihadist presence in the Sahel has emerged via two pathways.  
The first pathway originated in Algeria in the north and initially targeted Mali. 
Following the Algerian military’s successful repression and co-optation of jihadists 
and rebels in the late 1990s, a new splinter group called the Groupe Salafiste de 
Prédication et de Combat (GSPC), with its headquarters in the Kabyle Mountains in 
northern and central Algeria, mandated their emir from the Algerian Sahara, Khaled 
Abu al-Abbas (also known as Mokhtar Belmokhar), to create an outpost in northern 
Mali. Tolerated by the Algerian intelligence agencies as long as his fighters did not 
touch the petro-installations in the south, over the following decade Belmokthar 
would develop relations with a number of local Islamist groups in the Sahel, as well 
as with Al-Qaeda’s central command in Afghanistan and Iraq. By strategically 
marrying the daughters of leading tribes in the Sahel region, Belmokthar would 
gradually acquire protection from local tribes and access to money laundering 
networks and smuggling routes for basic consumption items across the Sahara, a 
practice that later inspired other jihadists who sought to settle in the region. 
Following GSPC’s integration into Al-Qaeda as its Maghreb branch (Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM), the group increased its presence in the Sahel and split 
the region into two administrative entities. One region covered south-western 
Algeria, northern Mali and Mauritania, directed by Belmokhtar, while the second 
region, comprising north-eastern Mali, northern Niger and western Chad, was 
directed by another Algerian from the former GSPC, Abu Zeid.  
The second pathway for the expansion of jihadists into the Sahel arose in northern 
Nigeria in the south and initially targeted Niger and the Lake Chad region.5 
Following repeated attacks by the Nigerian security forces, in the early and mid-
2000s supporters of the Islamist Youssoufiyya Boko Haram movement, which had 
emerged in the Maiduguri area in Borno State in northern Nigeria, would find shelter 
in the town of Diffa in southern Niger. Organized around the central mosque in 
Diffa with financial support from prosperous Kanouri traders, Boko Haram was able 
to mobilize young Nigeriens and create a rear base in the Sahel that assured it 
regular supplies of gasoline, weapons and food for the jihadists in Nigeria. According 
to many observers, since the capture and execution of Boko Haram’s former spiritual 
leader, Mohammed Yousuf, Boko Haram’s presence in the Sahel has been weakened 
in spite of reports of increased relations with Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. Hence, its 
current leader, Abukar Shekau, has faced continuous internal dissent and challenges 
to his ability to maintain the connection to the Sahel from the Lake Chad region, 
although the group remains capable of transporting gasoline, weapons and food 
through southern Libya, Niger and Chad into Nigeria. Until now, this control over 
smuggling networks and routes, together with financial support from the global 
support network, has allowed the group to “buy” support among elements of the 
local populations.6
While jihadism was still a modest phenomenon in the Sahel in the early 2000s, 
organized under the banners of emirs fleeing Algerian and Nigerian repression, the 
past few years have seen a tremendous growth in their activities. Indeed, today the 
Sahel region hosts multiple jihadist groups operating independently or in more or 
less stable alliances with regional and international networks and organizations like 
Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. In Mali, for example, the country in the Sahel that has 
arguably been most affected by jihadism, the French-led anti-terrorism efforts to 
liberate the northern areas of the country from their jihadist annexation in 2012 
have not prevented the Peuhl-dominated centre of the country from seeing a parallel 
spike in jihadist mobilization under the banners of the so-called Macina Brigades.
 
Much like trans-regional migration, the threat of jihadism has turned into a European 
problem primarily due to the weak performance of the states in the Sahel and the 
collapse of Libya. 
Certainly, the current wave of jihadist mobilization in the Sahel region draws on 
many structural weaknesses on the part of states in the Sahel similar to those 
that have driven other types of militant mobilization in the past. Like members of 
ethnic, separatist, tribal, nationalist and other armed groups, jihadists in the Sahel 
mobilize supporters by a combination of intimidation, attraction and exploitation of 
a range of pre-existing conflicts over access to resources, norms and governance. 
They actively manipulate the injustices generated by corruption in the public and 
private sectors to harness support for their project to replace the existing order with 
an Islamist alternative. They offer protection, control and access to resources and 
basic services that the Sahel states fail to deliver. They point to the generalised use 
of disproportionate force by local and international coercive agencies to justify their 
own violent practices. They utilize animosities and conflicts among ethnic and tribal 
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groups and exploit the strains generated by the rapid population growth to garner 
support. Finally, they appeal to individuals whose expectations of life are hampered 
by the insufficient opportunities generated by domestic job markets and slumping 
growth rates in the already poor Sahel states.7
Until recently, moreover, jihadists were allowed considerable room for manoeuvre 
by the regimes and states in the Sahel. In contrast to North African states like 
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, which during the 1990s build up strong security 
agencies geared to ferociously repressing the jihadists in their countries, the regimes 
in the Sahel initially allowed jihadists arriving from Algeria and Nigeria relative 
freedom of manoeuvre. With the exception of Mauritania and Chad, during the 
2000s key Sahel countries like Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso entered into mutual 
non-aggression pacts with the jihadists, allowing them to operate as long as they 
did not attack the states’ core interests, rather than engaging in costly repression 
campaigns that these weak states were unsure of winning. 
The collapse of northern Mali in 2012 challenged this laissez-faire model on the part 
of the Sahel states and brought the question how to handle the jihadist expansion 
in the region to the forefront of both Sahelian and European governments. In 2012, 
northern Mali once again became the scene for a new secessionist rebellion initiated 
by armed Tuareg organized under the framework of their nationalist umbrella 
organization, the Movement National de la Libération de Azawad (MNLA). Acting in 
close alignment with the former Tuareg rebel leader, Iyad ag Ghali, who shortly 
before had created a new jihadist group known as the Supports of Religion (Ansar 
Dine), the MNLA successfully chased the Malian army out of the north in a short-
lived rebellion. Forming an alliance with AQIM military commanders Abou Zeid and 
Belmokhtar, as well as units of a newly created Malian and Mauritanian Al-Qaeda 
affiliate known as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Iyad 
ag Ghali and the jihadists quickly took control of the main strategic centres in 
northern Mali, with Abu Zeid’s units settling into the north-western region around 
Timbuktu, and Belmokhtar’s units and MUJAO taking control of the north-eastern 
region of Gao.
It was this inability on the part of the Sahel states to handle the challenge of jihadism 
themselves, together with the failure of North African and Sahel powers to act 
decisively and collectively, that in 2013 prompted the French government to lead a 
UN-sanctioned military intervention to defeat the jihadist occupation of northern 
Mali and restore its government’s authority over the country. 
While the initial aim of chasing the jihadists out of northern Mali and restoring the 
government in Bamako has been partially achieved through France’s military 
intervention and the ensuing UN peacekeeping mission, this has not prevented 
jihadism from spreading further into the Sahel outside Mali. As late as spring 2017, 
a host of the most prominent jihadist groups in the Sahel joined forces and formed 
a new jihadist coalition, the so-called Supporters of Islam and the Muslims (SIM). 
Gathering prominent jihadist leaders in the Sahel like Iyad Ag-Ghali from Ansar Dine, 
Yahya Abu Al-Hammam from AQIM’s Sahara region, Amadou Koufa, the leader of 
the powerful Peulh-based “Macina brigade” of Ansar Dine in central Mali, 
Abderrahmane Al-Sanhaji, the “judge” of AQIM (qadi), and Al-Hassan Al-Ansari, 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s deputy from Al-Mourabitoun, the new group swore allegiance 
to Al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, Taleban’s Haibatullah Akhundzada and AQIM’s 
North African emir, the Algerian Abdelmalek Droukdel.
The collapse of northern Mali in 2012 challenged this  
laissez-faire model on the part of the Sahel states and brought 
the question how to handle the jihadist expansion in the region 
to the forefront of both Sahelian and European governments.
Hence, globally since 2013, the combined factors of persistent structural state 
weakness, increasing jihadist expansion and increasing trans-regional migration 
have placed the Sahel at the top of European foreign and security priorities. 
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STATE WEAKNESS IN THE SAHEL 
State weakness in the Sahel is a key factor in explaining why and how trans-regional 
jihadist movements and migration have developed into challenges and threats to 
European security and stability. One way to illustrate this weakness on the part of 
the Sahel states is to examine the macro-indicators of the various national 
economies. As shown in the figure below, Sahel states’ GDPs per capita are some of 
the lowest in the world, obviously far behind those of wealthy North European states 
like Denmark, but also well below those of their neighbours in the Maghreb. 
Sahel state’s GDP per capita remains extremely low
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
Niger
Burkina Faso
Mali
Morocco
Tunisia
Denmark 60,630
3,430
3,370
837
753
447
Per capita GDP in billion USD
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
High 
Alert
Niger
Algeria
Morocco
Tunesia
Libya
Mali
Burkina
Faso
Alert
High 
Warning
Consumption
16 EUROPE AND THE SAHEL-MAGHREB CRISIS EUROPE AND THE SAHEL-MAGHREB CRISIS 17
The tiny revenues that the Sahel states can mobilize are derived from three sources: 
first, the highly vulnerable agro-pastoral sector (cotton in Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Chad; groundnuts, rice and fisheries in Senegal and Mauritania, and livestock); 
secondly, highly-valued but extremely volatile natural resources (uranium in Niger; 
iron ore in Mauritania; gold in Mali and Burkina; oil in Chad); and thirdly, international 
donor aid. 
However, each of these revenue streams is influenced by political factors. Economic 
challenges do not constitute objective, natural conditions; rather, they are filtered 
through and shaped by political dynamics, including harsh financial conditions 
imposed by foreign donors and international financial organizations, coupled with 
damaging clientelist practices. To various degrees, the extraction and allocation of 
resources in Sahelian states follow a ‘neo-patrimonial’ logic that undermines their 
economies and, in turn, their capacities as states. This also means that direct, 
unhindered and fair access to state services is often difficult for the average citizen 
of these states. Personal connections are often required, and when they are not 
available, resorting to paid, informal intermediaries becomes a necessity.
Unhindered and fair access to state services is often difficult  
for the average citizen of these states.
As Jean-Hervé Jezequel points out, the budgets of the Sahel states are structurally 
“unbalanced” in the sense that they have a weak fiscal basis due to high levels of tax 
evasion and the low institutional ability of these states to collect tax revenues.8 
Foreign donor aid therefore plays a central role in paving the way for the emergence 
of a “gatekeeper” logic. That is, most of the political power emanates from the 
capital or key sites such as major mining districts and is based on the ability of the 
ruling elites to control “gates” that connect the country to the outside world and 
through which most state resources flow. 
Limited inclusion 
Another intrinsically linked challenge to the Sahel states is their limited ability to 
provide services to their populations. Sahelian and West African ruling elites are a 
particular problem in this regard. Over the past three decades, the ruling elites in 
the region have experienced little renewal and to the broader population appear to 
be closed circles with an exclusive interest in power. In Niger during the 2016 
presidential elections, for instance, all of the prominent contenders for powers had 
been active in politics since at least the early 1990s. A similar situation can be 
observed in Mali, where the population, which is predominantly under 25 years of 
age, is governed by a president and a prime minister who are now in their seventies. 
This burgeoning gerontocracy in present-day Sahel regimes helps explain their 
inability to mobilize support from the younger generations in their respective 
populations. 
Sahel states have further perpetuated notions of marginalization by focusing quite 
exclusively on the central regions of the country, where the governing elites live, as 
do the bulk of their constituents. Partially because it is cheaper and more politically 
expedient to provide public services to urban dwellers in the cities and towns than it 
is to the nomadic or semi-nomadic population groups living in the rural settlements, 
the state elites have neglected their states’ territorial hinterlands and those living 
there. For example, access to public schooling varies dramatically between urban 
and rural areas. According to Mali’s last Demographic and Health Survey (2013), the 
male literacy rate is 69 per cent and the female rate 47 per cent in urban areas (with 
the capital, Bamako, peaking at 72 and 51 per cent respectively), but only 27 and 12 
per cent respectively in rural areas. In the Mopti region, which already had the lowest 
level of public education in Mali before the jihadists shut down public education 
entirely in 2012, the percentage was down to 20 per cent for men and 10 per cent 
for women. 
Over the past three decades, the ruling elites in the Sahel region 
have experienced little renewal and to the broader population 
appear to be closed circles with an exclusive interest in power.
The meagre penetration of the educational system reflects the more general 
absence of these states from the sparsely populated rural areas outside the main 
cities. In northern Mali, for instance, the state had been literally absent, even before 
the 2012 crisis broke out. The few state representatives travelling in this area were 
security forces, who were seen as predators on rather than protectors of the local 
population, and often acted as such, with recurrent reports of widespread corruption 
and inadequate performance by government officials. A growing, but still minor 
proportion of the population has even come to see the government as a nuisance 
that they would like to dispose of. This is especially true of communities like the 
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nomadic Fulanis, who are numerically under-represented in the government and 
its administration. The Fulanis therefore welcomed the departure of state officials 
in the wake of the increasing attacks on towns in northern Mali in the beginning 
of 2015.
This accumulated impact of the inability of the Sahel states to impose themselves 
on the territories beyond the confines of their capitals and main districts and create 
a legitimate presence there has fuelled the rise of a broad variety of armed groups 
in the region, ranging from separatist movements and self-defence militias to 
jihadist and criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers. In most cases, these 
armed groups have proliferated by filling the economic and security vacuums 
created by the departure of the state authorities in these regions. While not all these 
groups are ideologically opposed to the region’s states, they do represent a serious 
challenge to their authority and capacity. Members of these armed groups and 
movements also demonstrate an ability to understand and adapt to local circum-
stances and outperform both the less motivated bureaucrats and soldiers sent 
from the capitals and the foreign “peacekeepers” sent from abroad. 
Deep roots of the weak states 
Perhaps because the problems in the Sahel have only recently turned into European 
security concerns, many international experts, policy-makers and practitioners alike 
tend mistakenly to assume that the weakness of the state is itself a recent 
phenomenon in the Sahel. As Cédric Jourde shows, however, this is a mistake.9
Indeed, the very idea of a Mauritanian state or a Chadian state was an entirely 
foreign invention until 1960, the year when all the Sahelian states were granted 
independence. The state was a European invention, one with which there was 
absolutely no sense of identification in the Sahel, except perhaps for the very small 
minority of local civil servants who had served the colonial apparatus. Not only was 
it a foreign invention, it was also seen by the new citizens primarily as a predatory 
institution. For most people, the colonial state in the Sahel was a foreign governance 
machine that only sought to prey on communities: it collected taxes, it rounded up 
men for forced labour or conscription, as well as children, to be sent to the Europeans’ 
schools, and it sought to control and slow down people’s mobility. This meant 
limiting the mobility of Tuareg, Moor, Arab, Fulani and Toubou pastoralists or semi-
pastoralists, whom French colonial officers tried to “fix” (sedentarize) on a given 
territory; the mobility of pilgrimages to Mecca through the French policy of quota 
and surveillance; the mobility of peasants, used to working fields on what had 
become two sides of a territorial border; and the mobility of shuyûkh (marabouts¸ 
clerics), who went about collecting their zakat from dispersed communities of their 
followers, to name but a few examples. One cannot underestimate the Sisyphean 
challenge that lay ahead of the new Sahelian post-colonial officials, who had to take 
over these states in a brief period of time, thus turning an institution seen as both 
foreign and predatory into “their” institution, one that represents “us” the population 
and that is here to serve our collective interests.    
Jourde thus reminds us that it is wrong to think about the fragility of the state as 
something that has emerged only recently, just as it is wrong to imagine that there 
was once a time, back in the 1960s and 1970s, when what became Sahelian states 
were strong (or “integral”, as the literature sometimes expresses it). Both the colonial 
and post-colonial states in the Sahel were, for the most part, skeletal administrative 
institutions. While they did have some degree of coercive power, they had little 
infrastructural power, understood as the capacity to govern through society. With 
the exception of the two “small” countries of the Sahel, Senegal and to some extent 
Burkina Faso (and even there, this is arguable), the actual territorial coverage of the 
various state institutions has always been thin. Jourde therefore encourages us to 
remember that Europeans faced the same structural conditions that pre-colonial 
rulers confronted: immense territories, harsh natural environments and low popu-
lation densities. Furthermore, French and British governments were not willing to 
spend many resources on these territories. Local colonial administrations faced 
iron rule imposed by Paris and London on their administrators overseas, especially 
in respect of financial self-sufficiency. Colonies and their subjects had to finance the 
colonial effort themselves without much in the way of investment from the metro-
politan centres. An easy solution to this problem was for colonial officials to rely on 
local chiefs and elites. It was therefore a combination of so-called traditional leaders 
(Shaykh, Amir, Ardo, Sultân, Naba, Jom Wûro, etc.), whose legitimacy was rooted in 
pre-colonial history, and Africans trained in European schools who provided most of 
the “state-like” human resources on the ground. Administrators were few in number 
and had to govern over vast stretches of territory. They could not “imprint their 
mark” over Sahel societies as they did elsewhere in their imperial possessions. 
Consider, for instance, that in 1939, some twenty years before independence, 3600 
French administrators governed all of French West Africa, which at that time had a 
total population of approximately fifteen million stretched over 4.6 million km2.10 
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STATE COLLAPSE IN LIBYA
The collapsing state figures prominently in the explanation of why European policy-
makers today regard the Sahel as a challenge and threat to Europe’s security and 
stability. Up until 2011, state weakness was not an issue associated with the North 
African states. Under the presidency of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, (1999-) Algeria, which 
had been North Africa’s most unstable country for decades, had left behind the 
violent mass conflicts that had threatened the regime’s survival in the 1990s. 
Instead, a fragile but stable social contract had emerged based on a broad redistri-
bution of resources generated through petroleum exports and a focused effort 
by the security agencies to push Islamist rebels south of Algeria’s borders into 
the Sahel. Egypt, which in the 1980s and 1990s had experienced smaller but 
prolonged waves of political violence by small Islamist rebel groups, had from the 
late 1990s experienced little political conflict. Instead a broad de-politicization 
process occurred in correlation with rapid macro-economic growth and the 
continued embedding of the Egyptian economy into the global system. In Libya, the 
normalization of international relations in the late 2000s, combined with the 
“reformist” profile of Muammar Gaddafi’s son and most probable heir, Seif al-Islam, 
was interpreted by many observers as a possible path towards greater internal 
stability, carrying with it the potential for increased regional cooperation in North 
Africa. Although experiencing occasional outbursts of Islamist political violence, the 
Moroccan monarchy could boast a remarkable degree of stability and continuity 
and seemed as if it were one of the few regimes in the region to enjoy relatively 
widespread popular support. In the small state of Tunisia, finally, the combined 
As a consequence, one could argue that many of today’s Sahelian states are in fact 
more present than ever before on their own territories. This does not mean that the 
state is immensely stronger than it was in the first thirty years of the post-colonial 
era: indeed, gendarmes and police officers fled and abandoned the citizens of 
Dountza in central Mali in 2012-2013 when the MNLA and then the MUJAO stormed 
in. But things were not much better before: in the 1970s, the Saharawi insurgents of 
the Polisario movement marched from the former Spanish Sahara (Western Sahara) 
all the way to Nouakchott and attacked it (1976) and were only stopped by a French 
air strike. Likewise, Chadian insurgencies rolled over the country in the 1980s and 
again in 2008 from the Sudanese border to N’Djamena, where they fought the 
government, which many believe only survived due to French assistance. 
One cannot underestimate the Sisyphean challenge that lay 
ahead of the new Sahelian post-colonial officials, who had to 
take over these states in a brief period of time, thus improving  
an institution seen as both foreign and predatory.
Until very recently, the history of the colonial and postcolonial states in the Sahel is 
thus a history of an institution which, outside urban centres, governed through a 
combination of direct rule in some localities and indirect rule in most others through 
local power-brokers who were partly independent of the state they represented. 
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efforts of investments in the small middle class and effective police repression had 
since the late 1990s pushed Tunisian jihadists to leave the country for more 
promising battlefields like that in Iraq.
To be sure, none of these North African regimes, governments and ruling elites 
could claim broad political support in the populations they governed. The regimes in 
the Maghreb were faced with their persistent inability to mobilize and sustain broad 
popular support. But there was and still is little reason to believe that significant 
population groups in the Maghreb are opposed to the existence of the states 
themselves. While often contesting the nature and composition of their govern-
ments and the regimes that control them, the populations of the Maghreb states 
generally seem to accept the post-colonial states’ borders, raison d’être and right to 
exist.
However, the uprisings in North Africa in 2011 exposed cracks in the apparent 
strength of these North African states. Following protracted conflicts between 
mass-mobilized populations aiming to transform the social pacts in their countries, 
the capacities of all North African states have fallen over the past six years.
State fragility has increased in Libya since 2011
As an indication of this process, in 2017 the annual Fund for Peace’s “Fragile States 
Index” classified the North African states as countries with an elevated risk of state 
fragility, with the exception of Libya, which was issued with an “alert” regarding its 
fragility. This contrasts starkly with how these states were classified in the previous 
decade. Until 2010, North African countries were considered to be at only moderate 
risk of state fragility, the risk being deemed the highest in Algeria, and Libya being 
seen as the most stable country in the region after Tunisia. The general trend over 
the past six years, however, has been that the North African countries have moved 
closer to their Sahelian neighbours in respect of multi-dimensional indices like that 
elaborated by the Fund for Peace.
 
Following protracted conflicts between mass-mobilized  
populations aiming to transform the social pacts in their 
countries, the capacities of all North African states have  
fallen over the past six years.
As indicated in the above figure, since 2011 Libya has collapsed into a weak and 
indeed very fragile state. Libya’s collapse is partially an outcome of policy oppor-
tunities missed by the international community. Indeed, since 2011, the UN has 
treated the growing crisis in Libya as an issue of secondary importance. In the wake 
of the international NATO-led military campaigns during the summer of 2011, which 
helped the insurgents put an end to Gaddafi’s regime, the UN failed to support the 
country’s transition towards a new government at all adequately. 
Operation Dawn and Operation Dignity
As Mohamed Eljarh points out, by 2014 the political landscape in Libya had all but 
collapsed.11 The parliamentary elections for Libya’s House of Representatives (HoR), 
which were to replace the transitional government formed by the General National 
Council (GNC) in 2012 in the wake of Gaddafi’s fall, did not bring peace to the 
country. Rather than disappearing from the political scene, as envisaged in the Road 
Map for the Libyan transition, the GNC refused to recognize the legitimacy of the 
HoR. From this point onwards, two parallel administrations and governments 
emerged in sharp competition with one another without either of them being able to 
impose its will on the other. The HoR found refuge in the city of Tobruk in the north-
east of the country, close to the Egyptian border, while the GNC had its base in 
Tripoli. These two political coalitions each received substantial external military 
support from a number of armed militias. The GNC was supported by the so-called 
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“Libyan Dawn”, which primarily consisted of Islamist militias, including elements of 
the Al-Qaida-affiliated Libyan Armed Fighting Group (LIFG), as well as the forces of 
the city of Misrata. Simultaneously, the HoR built an alliance with the so-called 
“Operation Dignity”, a coalition of armed militias created in 2014 in the eastern city 
of Benghazi by the former Libyan general, Khalifa Haftar, with the explicit aim of 
eliminating the Islamist militias. Due to its alliance with the HoR, Operation Dignity 
would declare itself to be the country’s only legitimate armed actor, changing its 
name into the “Libyan National Army”. 
Rise of armed groups
In correlation with the paralysis of Libya’s political institutions due to the power 
struggle between HoR and GNC, and to some extent as a consequence of it, the 
ability to implement decisions on the ground remained in the hands of militias and 
armed groups that had either fought during the rebellion against Gaddafi or were 
formed in the wake of the fall of his regime as self-defence and policing units. Rather 
than operating as a single unified actor, the armed groups were split between 
autonomous and decentralized actors operating outside any centralized chain of 
command and following the whims of militia leaders with a vested interest in their 
local villages, cities or regions of origin, rather than the nation as a whole. Finally, as 
the conflict dragged on, the absence of institutional cohesion and political unity 
provided a fertile environment for jihadist groups to gain a foothold in the northern 
cities, forces which, until then, had mainly been present in the thinly populated 
southern Sahara region. In particular, from November 2014, so-called “Islamic State” 
(IS or Daesh) expanded its presence in Libya’s north after creating its first “province” 
in Derna. During 2015, and after being forced to flee from Derna, it gradually moved 
to control the northern city of Sirte, from where it expanded further along the Libyan 
coast during most of 2016. Later the same year it was expelled by a coalition of 
international military actors and militias from Misrata. One year later, by early 2017, 
the fight against Islamic State forces had progressed well, the bulk of the fighting on 
the ground being undertaken by the Al-Bunyan Al-Marsus militia from Misrata. The 
international, mainly US-American involvement in these operations consisted 
primarily in providing air support, coordinating intelligence with local groups and 
deploying a limited number of special forces.
In contrast to what is often assumed, the Libyan militias draw on deep historical 
roots and can to some extent be considered to reproduce the militia-based character 
of the Libyan state inherited from the Gaddafi regime. The latter had been founded 
on a balance between paramilitary forces, composed of a skillful mixture of the 
“tribes” that had sworn allegiance to the regime, enabling them to be represented 
and participate in governing. The army was perceived as a threat to be neutralized, 
even if this meant weakening it and making it militarily incapable. The army was 
thus unable to promote its own values and interests as a body or institution, unlike 
other military institutions in the region. Nor could it develop its own economy within 
Libyan society, which might have allowed it to recycle its staff or form connections 
of influence. The political determination to sabotage the development of the Libyan 
army can be explained in terms of the complex, subtle and contradictory relationship 
between the Libyan Jamahiriya and the state. In the philosophy of the Jamahiriya, 
the state was destined to disappear to make room for local political structures in 
which the tribes would play a fundamental role. Gaddafi’s revolutionary Libya was 
based on the model of a “just society” inspired by a “tribal” political model. In his 
Green Book, Gaddafi claimed that the tribe was “a natural social umbrella” and that 
“through its traditions, it guarantees its members social protection”. By contrast, 
“the State is an artificial political, economic and at times military system that has 
nothing to do with humanity”. Society must therefore be based not on the state, but 
on the tribe. For Gaddafi, “the tribe is a family that has become extended through 
births. The tribe is a large family. The nation is an extended tribe.” In fact, this tribal 
imagery was the product of contemporary political transformations: Gaddafi’s 
Libya was part of a longer continuity for the Libyan state, shaped by its tribal configu-
ration ever since acquiring independence in 1951. Indeed, as historian Ali Abdullatif 
Ahmida shows, the kingdom of King Idris, ruler of Libya from 1951 to 1969, was 
founded on a religious order, but was also profoundly influenced by the tribal 
configuration in Cyrenaica. From this point of view, the army and state looked like 
the two obstacles to the success of the revolution. These perceptions of the state 
and army remain unchanged among today’s militias. 
Are these militias the products of Gaddafi’s revolutionary philosophy, according 
to which Libya was duty-bound to remain in a “state of permanent tension”? The 
Jamahiriya supported the theory of “people in arms” so that “each town might be 
transformed into a barracks where the inhabitants would train each day”, being 
duty-bound to maintain this “tension” through revolutionary committees. In 1995, 
so as to conform to this principle, Gaddafi announced that the army had been 
dissolved to the advantage of the people’s brigades, which were now supposed to 
ensure the protection of the nation against all forms of aggression. After Gaddafi’s 
fall, tens of thousands of combatants gathered into brigades linked to towns or 
neighborhoods and occupied the public spaces that had been deserted by the 
former regime’s security forces to protect the revolution. The militias had derived 
revolutionary legitimacy from their struggle with the Gaddafi regime, but they 
were increasingly challenged by those elected in the elections of 7 July 2012, who 
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claimed political legitimacy as a consequence. For the political representatives of 
transitional Libya, disarming the militias and integrating them into the security 
forces is a major challenge. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the Libyan 
authorities gave the militias an ultimatum: “The mobile national force under the 
command of the chief of staff asks all armed individuals, groups and formations 
occupying army barracks, public buildings or the properties of members of the 
former regime or of Muammar Gaddafi’s children in Tripoli or surrounding towns, to 
evacuate these sites within 48 hours.” Clearly it will take much longer than two days 
for the government to be obeyed, probably several years until a security apparatus 
emerges that is independent of the militias.
Limitations of the UN process
Having done little to halt the deterioration of the security situation in Libya in the 
wake of Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, in early 2015, the international community launched 
a series of dialogue meetings with stakeholders in the Libyan crisis under the 
leadership of the UN. Following lengthy negotiations, a new unity government, the 
Government of National Accord (GNA), was announced by the UN in October 2015, 
and a Presidential Council headed by the Libyan political figure Fayez al-Farraj was 
established to provide oversight of the GNA and appoint military leaders. It was 
initially supposed to govern for one year through an inclusive approach incorporating 
members of both the HoR and the GNC. 
However, in contrast to the progress that has been made in fighting IS forces on the 
ground in Libya, the political process and the attempt to recreate a functioning 
government seems largely to have failed. As Mohammed Ben Lamma points out, 
Libya’s political landscape remains split between several competing camps, and 
the failure to include the GNC in the institutional process around the GNA threatens 
to create new fragmentation and competition within and between the partners and 
coalitions that would have to hammer out a comprehensive peace deal in Libya.12 
Yet, for all its flaws, the political dialogue that led up to the establishment of a unity 
government, as well as the actual creation of the GNA, remains an important 
instrument for creating a comprehensive peace deal and stabilizing Libya in the 
long run. 
By early 2017, the challenges arising from this partially disengaged approach had 
emerged in full. First, the UN-brokered deal excluded a number of key actors. The 
delegations that signed the Libyan political agreement that did emerge out of the 
UN-led dialogue peace process in 2015 and 2016 have little or no control over 
Libya’s territory or its inhabitants. The procedures that are currently being followed 
in the negotiations between the Libyans and the UN give the impression that the 
actors are sitting around the table in two blocs, but this is not the case. The camps 
in Tripoli and Tobruk are far from uniform, and fluid alliances are created across 
ideological, political, national and local cleavages that reflect Libya’s recent history, 
the 2011 conflict, and local and regional affiliations. In addition, the inability of the 
UN to find viable solutions reflects the challenge involved in including the tribes that 
supported Gaddafi in the dialogue, in particular the Warfalla and the Warshefana, 
but also the Megaras, which together represent as much as 30% of the population.
In contrast to the progress that has been made in fighting IS  
forces on the ground in Libya, the political process and the  
attempt to recreate a functioning government seems largely  
to have failed.
Secondly, the UN accord does not have sufficient consensus behind it. The insi-
stence by UN Special Envoy Bernadino León on a rapid signing process sacrificed 
the building of a necessary consensus and cohesion around the compromise over 
the GNA’s Presidential Council. Moreover, in reality, the GNA reflects neither the 
entirety of Libya’s regions nor the political-military factions on the ground. As such 
the key question with regard to security finds no response in the UN-brokered 
dialogue. The political accord does not touch upon the reconversion of the armed 
groups or the reconstruction of the army and security services. 
Thirdly, the UN-brokered peace accord is challenged by conflicts of interest between 
the international powers and the regional great powers. In particular, the UN-
brokered agreement states that it needs to be ratified by the HoR, even though 
Western capitals consider this body to be of negligible importance. Another group, 
however, led by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Russia, is in favour of a 
more legally strict approach that favours the HoR even more. These international 
divisions have caused divergences in the application of sanctions against those 
circumventing the Skhirat Agreement. The EU and the United States have imposed 
travel bans and financial sanctions on the president of the HoR (Aguila Salah) and 
the president of the GNC (Nouri Bousahmein), but Russian and Egyptian diplomats 
consider these sanctions illegitimate. 
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Finally, regional rivalry and competition pose a substantial threat to the application 
of the accord. The covert support provided by regional and international great 
powers to different armed groups on the ground in Libya has continued to undermine 
the deal. On the one hand, Egypt and the UAE have developed significant cooperation 
on military and intelligence issues with Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army 
and have called for a lifting of the embargo on arms sales imposed on these actors. 
Other players, in contrast, such as Turkey and Qatar, have supported groups close to 
the Muslim Brotherhood out of a mixture of geopolitical and ideological interests. In 
sum, regional and international actors continue to pursue divergent objectives 
resulting from the ambiguities of the different states that are caught between 
contradictory geopolitical interests and a lack of international leadership.
The consequence of the international community’s failure to address these key 
challenges on the ground has been to undermine the dialogue process and the 
peace accords signed in Skhirat. Instead of a unified Libya, the country has seen 
state institutions continuing to be split, with one set of institutions governing the 
east of the country and another the west. Rather than solving the conflicts between 
east and west, the Presidential Council and the GNA have created new administrative 
councils and institutions, thus paving the way for the emergence of a third set of 
rival government institutions. This hardly seems like paving the way to a restoration 
of peace and stability, but in fact threatens the absolute collapse of the state. 
THE FAILURE OF REGIONAL  
COLLABORATION 
The inability of the regional powers in the Maghreb and East Africa to prevent the 
states of Mali and Libya from further imploding during 2012 and 2013 is the key 
factor that explains Europe’s increasing concerns over the insecurity in the Sahel 
region. 
None of the surrounding regional powers, namely Algeria,  
Morocco and Nigeria, proved capable of acting decisively 
against the threats to regional stability posed by the jihadist 
take-over of northern Mali and the failure of a central Sahel  
state that this represented.
Initially there were some indications that the regional powers might play a part in 
solving these crises. In other words, in the wake of the ending of the bipolar world 
order and the beginning of US retrenchment during the 2000s, the regional powers 
had come to play increasingly important roles in international politics. As such, 
hopes grew among experts that those surrounding the Sahel would intervene to 
restore stability and rebuild a peaceful regional order. However, in the Sahel region 
itself the crisis in Mali in 2012-2013 disappointed this expectation. When the Malian 
state collapsed in 2012 following the implosion of Libya, a sense of insecurity and 
alert spread among the regional powers in the Sahel and North Africa. Regional 
powers like Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt had come to fear a potential spill-
over of insecurity and the potential challenge to their own territorial integrity from 
30 EUROPE AND THE SAHEL-MAGHREB CRISIS EUROPE AND THE SAHEL-MAGHREB CRISIS 31
armed jihadist groups and other militant non-state actors. The establishment of a 
territorial outpost of the Islamic State in Sirte on the coast of Libya in 2015 sparked 
further fears that the Sahel and North Africa could in the near future experience 
challenges to their regional security along the lines of those experienced in the 
Middle East over the past five years. However, none of the surrounding regional 
powers, namely Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria, proved capable of acting decisively 
against the threats to regional stability posed by the jihadist take-over of northern 
Mali and the failure of a central Sahel state that this represented. 
This inability to find common ground is rooted in the non-institutionalized and 
unregulated competition of the regional powers. As Abdenour Benantar points out, 
we can understand some of the mechanisms that are driving this competition by 
looking at the proliferation and multiplicity of competing, overlapping and utterly 
ineffective “dialogue” and “peace” initiatives that the region has witnessed over the 
past few years.13
The proliferation of peace initiatives
In the wake of the take-over of power in northern Mali by the jihadists from Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies in 2012, the regional powers surrounding 
Mali put forward several peace and dialogue initiatives involving different con-
stellations of local actors and regional powers. The Maghreb Union, which was 
launched in 1991 to bring together the major North African powers from Morocco to 
Libya, had been inactive for decades due to the protracted and unresolved conflict 
and rivalry between Morocco, Algeria and, prior to Gaddafi’s fall, Libya. As such, 
these initiatives came either from other regional institutions, such as the African 
Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or 
from individual member states imagining themselves to be playing a role as regional 
hegemons.  
The first attempt to address the crisis in Mali emerged from the so-called Pays du 
Champ Initiative, which had been created in April 2010 by Algeria and brought 
together the Sahel countries of Mali, Mauritania and Niger. At the time, its objective 
was to coordinate security efforts, in particular the fight against terrorism and 
organized crime in the Sahel-Maghreb area. The Pays du Champ initiative had the 
aim of becoming the primary security coordination instrument in the area under 
the leadership of Algeria. Having a joint military command, the Comité des États-
Majors Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC) based in Tamanrasset, as well as an 
intelligence unit, L’Unité de Fusion et de Liaison (UFL) headquartered in Algiers, the 
initiative brought together intelligence units from eight countries in the Sahel and 
North Africa. However, the rapid expansion of terrorist groups in northern Mali and 
their eventual ability to bring into question the very existence of the state of Mali 
perfectly demonstrated the failure of this regional initiative. With the exception of 
Algeria, CEMOC’s member states are militarily ill-equipped and lack the necessary 
financial resources to change this in the near future. Hence the initiative possesses 
no real national instruments that can be pooled in the case of an urgent need for 
collective security action in the region. As a consequence, some of the measures 
taken within CEMOC’s framework, such as the pursuit of terrorist groups across 
borders, were from the outset wishful thinking rather than having any real potential 
for security action in the region. With regard to the exchanging of intelligence, 
the North Africa-Sahel environment, which is characterized by competition rather 
than by coordination and collaboration between the regional powers, starting with 
Algeria and Morocco, has greatly hampered CEMOC’s ability to become a platform 
for sharing sensitive information that even close allies in other parts of the world 
would find it difficult to share. When the crisis in Mali broke out into the open in 
2012, the Pays du Champ initiative therefore remained generally immobilized and 
incapable of responding to the crisis.   
None of the regional initiatives has so far been able to  
overcome the entrenched regional rivalries between the  
great powers in and around the Sahel region.
After the coup in Bamako in 2012, ECOWAS proposed to deploy militarily in 
agreement with the AU. Hence both the ECOWAS Standby Force Mission in Mali 
(MICEMA) and the AU-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), though 
planned on the drawing board, lacked adequate funding, capacity and political 
support. However, at the end of 2013, AFISMA’s concept of operations was revised 
and adjusted and its deployment was accelerated to support Operation Serval and 
the Malian authorities in recovering the northern territories from the jihadist groups 
that had seized them. In March 2013, as the crisis in Mali was unfolding, the AU 
launched its own regional peace and dialogue initiative, known as the Nouakchott 
Process. Proposed by the AU’s Peace and Security Commission, the Nouakchott 
Process includes eleven member countries from across the Sahel and Maghreb, its 
aim being to strengthen security cooperation within the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) in the Sahel-Saharan region. Much like previous initiatives in the 
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region, however, the APSA’s effectiveness has been hampered by the persistent 
rivalries between the regional great powers. For instance, Morocco remained 
excluded from the Nouackchott process until its recent reintegration into the AU.  
The proliferation of initiatives has served as a means to  
neutralize their very effectiveness.
Following the collapse of the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2013, which was led by 
ECOWAS and presided over by Blaise Campaoré, in early 2014 the inability of the 
regional great powers to act decisively prompted external powers like France to take 
the lead in pursuing regional peace and dialogue directly with the Sahel states. In 
February 2014, the so-called “G5-Sahel” was launched bringing Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger and Chad together under a single structure closely affiliated with 
French military actions in the region. The G5-Sahel group aims at strengthening 
exchanges of information, border security and the capacities of the intelligence and 
security services in the Sahel-Saharan region. It is a local consultation framework 
tasked with coordinating the initiatives launched by international partners and its 
member states. The structure does offer some clarity to external security providers 
by circumventing some of the more complicated power rivalries between, for 
example, Morocco and Algeria. Instead, it allows the external partners to coordinate 
their actions directly with the Sahel states. As such, external security providers such 
as the French forces of Operation Barkhane and the project “Appui à la Coopération 
Transfrontalière au Sahel” (ACTS), as well as the UN Integrated Strategy for the 
Sahel (SINUS) and the European Strategy for the Sahel, can act in cooperation and 
coordination with the local Sahel states. This also provides a formal instrument for 
the Sahel states themselves to institutionalize regional collaboration. An example is 
the involvement of Burkina Faso in regional mediation around the Malian conflict, 
which in June 2013 brought about the signing of agreements between the Malian 
transitional government and the Azawad movements. At the same time, the G5-
Sahel suffers from all the well-known defects of the Sahel states themselves, 
namely corruption, a lack of national cohesion, persistent poverty and institutional 
failures as a result of weak governance. As such it remains questionable whether 
this new structure will, in the end, prove to be anything more than an empty shell 
allowing international actors to assume the task of security provision abandoned by 
the dysfunctional regional powers in the Sahel and North Africa. 
The larger picture conveyed over the past few years is thus one of a strong 
proliferation of dialogue and peace initiatives targeting the Sahel region. As exposed 
in the case of the conflict in Mali, however, none of these regional initiatives has so 
far been able to overcome the entrenched regional rivalries between the great 
powers in and around the Sahel region. Hence, the proliferation of mediation and 
dialogue initiatives targeting the crisis in Mali, which at first sight might seem to be 
a positive achievement indicating progress and action, masks a more worrying 
conclusion, namely that the proliferation of initiatives has also been exploited by the 
great powers in and around Sahel as a way of neutralizing the efforts of their rivals 
and competitors. Based on a zero-sum logic known already from the failure to 
resolve the Western Sahara conflict, the regional great powers in and around the 
Sahel have prioritized neutralizing the initiatives of their rivals in supporting effective 
peace and mediation initiatives because otherwise they would be forced to 
compromise with these same rivals. The instrument used by regional powers to 
pursue this policy has been the proliferation of dialogue and mediation initiatives, 
choices over whom to invite having been carefully crafted to serve regional power 
struggles rather than local conflict resolution. In short, the proliferation of initiatives 
has served as a means to neutralize their very effectiveness. 
Moroccan soft-power and Algerian disengagement
As Anouar Boukhars points out, Morocco is also involved in several regional security 
cooperation initiatives that offer military and border security training to allied 
countries in the Sahel and West Africa.14 Morocco’s intelligence services are also 
active in some parts of the Sahel, and its telecommunication company, Maroc 
Telecom, which has six African subsidiaries, is suspected of gathering and sharing 
intelligence information on extremist groups wherever it operates. In the summer of 
2016, Morocco injected itself into the struggle against Boko Haram by providing 
Niger with military equipment. The recent return of Morocco to the AU will have a 
further impact on the evolution of a Moroccan military role in the Sahel and beyond. 
However, Morocco’s attempt to gain a foothold in the Sahel and more generally in 
Africa uses soft power initiatives. Acknowledging that it cannot replace Algeria as a 
regional security provider in the Sahel, nor in Mali, in the absence of a resolution of 
the conflict between Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara, Morocco has 
skilfully sought alternative ways, beyond hard security, to garner alliances and 
construct a power basis in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Over the past sixteen years, King Mohammed VI has literally been Africa-trotting, 
promoting the attractiveness of Moroccan businesses and developing vehicles for 
strategic partnerships combining complementary strengths, visions and solidarity. 
These royal visits are followed by economic and investment deals in banking, 
insurance, telecommunications, mining, renewable energy, agricultural sustainability, 
fishing and infrastructure. Today, the world’s leading phosphate exporter, Morocco’s 
Office Cherifien de Phosphate (OCP), Attijariwafa Bank, Maroc Telecom, Royal Air 
Maroc and real estate developer Addoha Group are well-rooted in several African 
countries. The FDI stock of Morocco in Mali rose from USD 6 million in 2002 to USD 
286 million in 2011. Through these corporations, investments and the recent 
creation of Casablanca Finance City (CFC), Morocco aspires to become a regional 
financial platform and gateway to Africa’s rapidly growing markets. Indeed, part of 
the allure of Morocco is the prospects it offers of South-South triangular cooperation 
in which the Kingdom uses its comparatives advantages to mobilize the resources 
of its allies in the Persian Gulf and its partners in the developed world to invest in 
Africa. 
The dramatic rise of jihadism in the Sahel has provided Morocco 
with an opportunity to tap into an additional instrument of soft 
power, namely religion.
These investment forays extend beyond the friendly terrain of Francophone West 
Africa, where Morocco is already the first investor, to regions long considered 
unfamiliar or unfriendly due to their support for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front 
in the Western Sahara conflict. Putting economics before politics, Morocco’s 
diplomacy has today managed to normalize relations with countries like Rwanda, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, South Sudan and Zambia. 
As a complement to this expansion of its economic footprint, Morocco has invested 
in boosting its soft power. Approximately six thousand African students are today 
enrolled in Moroccan universities at the expense of the Moroccan state, and 
Moroccan state and private media groups such as Medi 1 Radio, Hit Radio and Eco 
Media have made inroads into Gabon, Burkina Faso and Senegal. In 2014, Morocco 
created the Federation of Atlantic African Press Agencies (FAAPA), which comprises 
some twenty African news agencies coordinated by the Moroccan News Agency 
(MAP) and an African training centre for journalists. In a parallel development, the 
Moroccan Cinematographic Centre (CCM) has funded several African projects and 
assisted in the co-production and post-production of African films. Furthermore, 
Morocco has invested in humanitarian aid, conducting vaccination campaigns, 
donating food crop seeds, deploying mobile hospital units to affected areas, building 
a military hospital and a cancer institute in Guinea and Gabon respectively, and 
helping establish a funding mechanism for seven thousand small farmers in 
Senegal. Finally, it has pursued an immigration policy aimed at polishing its image 
to the detriment of its rival Algeria, as seen in the decision to dispatch humanitarian 
aid to around 1500 African migrants expelled by Algeria to Niger in December 2016. 
Moreover, Morocco has hosted large-scale events of international importance such 
as the 2016 Marrakech Climate Change Conference (COP22), in which it appeared 
as an advocate for Africa’s farmers and showcased its own initiatives in improving 
soil management and adapting African agriculture. Similarly, it has launched major 
initiatives to power agricultural sustainability and improve food security through the 
building of fertilizer plants adapted to local soils in several African countries, most 
notably Rwanda, Ethiopia and Nigeria.  
The dramatic rise of jihadism in the Sahel has provided Morocco with an opportunity 
to tap into an additional instrument of soft power, namely religion. Drawing on the 
Tidjania Sufi order, which boasts millions of adherents in West Africa, and whose 
most visited holy site is in the Moroccan city of Fez, Morocco has exploited this 
heritage to nurture powerful networks of influence in the Sahel and beyond. For 
years, Morocco has been financing the construction of mosques, restorations of 
religious edifices and the provision of copies of the holy Quran in many countries, 
including most recently in Tanzania and Madagascar. At the same time, King 
Mohamed VI has actively promoted a spiritually orientated and tolerant brand of 
Islam, known as the Sufi-Maliki tradition, as an alternative to the Salafi and jihadist 
tendencies in the Sahel. The country’s multimillion-dollar Mohammed VI Institute 
for training imams, inaugurated in 2015, and the Foundation for the African Ulama, 
constructed in 2016, are good illustrations of how Morocco is attempting to shape 
Islam in Africa.  
Morocco’s foreign policy in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa over the past one and 
a half decades has returned it handsome geopolitical and economic dividends. 
Today, Moroccan diplomacy is working smoothly in most of Africa, as shown by its 
recent reintegration into the African Union. In spite of this appearance as a 
hyperactive actor in the Sahel and in sub-Saharan Africa, however, Moroccan foreign 
policy has had no direct effect on the Malian crisis, nor on the broader question of 
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security and stability in the Sahel region. Rather, Morocco’s long-term aim is directed 
at rebalancing the kingdom’s cultural, religious and economic ties with the Sahel 
region and Africa in general in the very long run after three decades of exclusion due 
to its annexation of the Western Sahara.  
Algeria, the region’s undisputed military powerhouse, has persistently avoided 
taking on too much responsibility in either of the crises in Libya and Mali. Rather 
than intervening and re-establishing order, Algeria watched unmoved as jihadist 
groups gained a foothold in northern Mali and grew into a force that threatened 
the country’s territorial sovereignty. In 2012 and 2013, this attitude rebounded on 
Algeria in the form of renewed threats to its vital oil and gas exploitation sites in the 
Sahara and of fears of a potential spill-over of separatist ambitions among its 
domestic Tuareg population groups in the Tamanrasset region. While beefing up its 
domestic security and border controls, Algeria has abstained from acting as a 
regional hegemon and is instead insisting on an African and regional solution to the 
crises surrounding it.
Competition rather than collaboration
Neither of today’s major powers in North Africa seems capable of contributing 
actively to solving the Malian crisis or to providing long-term security and stability in 
the Sahel. Both countries’ interpretations of the Malian crisis have been influenced 
by their respective internal concerns and their assessments of the need to balance 
one another and prevent any possible tilt of one in favour of the other. Unwilling and 
unable to take an objective stance in respect of the crisis in Mali, they have mutually 
reduced themselves to spectators rather than actors in both conflict resolution and 
the broader process of providing security and stability in Mali and the Sahel. In the 
wake of the retrenchment of the US superpower and the ending of the bipolar world 
order, experts initially aired hopes that the regional powers in and around the Sahel 
would fill the void and re-establish a functioning regional order and stability, as seen 
in other parts of the world. They have now been disappointed, as over the past five 
years the regional powers in and around the Sahel have failed to provide any effective 
or viable regional security.  
Further to the south, the Nigerian authorities dragged their feet for some time before 
launching a military campaign to oust Boko Haram. As a result, since the mid-2000s 
the group has been able to establish a presence outside Nigeria in the Lake Chad 
region, northern Cameroon and Niger. Finally, Egypt, the region’s second largest 
investor in military equipment (only surpassed by Algeria), has largely reduced itself 
to an inactive observer of the collapse of order in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi and 
the subsequent establishment of an outpost of Islamic State in the country. Bogged 
down by its own internal transition after the fall of Mubarak and the subsequent 
repression of a full-scale rebellion in Sinai, Egypt adopted a limited strategy of 
propping up Khalifa Haftar in Libya as the cheapest option, giving it a local proxy 
capable of stabilizing its borders with Egypt and countering Libya’s growing number 
of jihadists.  
Over the past five years the regional powers in and around  
the Sahel have failed to provide any effective or viable  
regional security.
However, the inability of the regional powers to restore order is not only a threat to the 
security and stability of the Sahel and North Africa, it is also a threat to Europe. Given 
its geographical proximity to North Africa and the Sahel, Europe cannot afford to see 
a collapse of security in the region. It will not be able to tolerate the direct security 
threats that are likely to emerge from the creation of a bastion of global jihadists in 
the Sahel or North Africa, nor the flows of refugees and migrants from increasingly 
unstable and economically underperforming regions. Whether acting directly in 
multilateral engagements, as under UN’s MINUSMA and in Operations Serval and 
Barkhane, or in in direct collaboration with local states, as in the current G5-Sahel 
initiative, in the absence of capable and willing regional powers in and around the 
Sahel, sooner or later the EU and its member states will be dragged into the role of 
providing security and acting as de facto regional hegemons in the Sahel.
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FRENCH COUNTERTERRORISM 
France, the former colonial power in the Sahel and the Maghreb, remains the single 
most important external actor in the Sahel, and possibly also in the Maghreb region. 
Since 2013, France has responded to the failures of domestic governments and 
regional powers by trying to handle the increasing threat from jihadists through its 
own foreign policy. This decision was not taken as part of a long-term strategic bid 
for regional hegemony, but seems rather to have been dictated by the sudden threat 
of the collapse of the Malian state.
In 2008 The French government produced a “Defence White 
Paper” that set out a policy of further reducing France’s strategic 
and military presence in Africa.
In response to increasing budgetary deficits, and in coordination with a more 
proactive American security presence in the Sahel in the wake of Al-Qaida’s attacks 
on 9/11, during the 2000s the French government sought a way to gradually 
decrease its obligations as a security provider and major development-aid donor in 
the two key regions of “Francafrique”. In 2008 The French government produced a 
“Defence White Paper” that set out a policy of further reducing France’s strategic 
and military presence in Africa. However, the collapse of the state in northern Mali in 
2012 and the ensuing inability of other regional and international actors to react 
decisively to the expansion of jihadist networks out of northern Mali prompted the 
French government to set aside its strategic decision to downsize its presence in 
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the Sahel and instead reengage militarily in the region. The ensuing Operation 
Serval, launched in early 2013, initially had a limited timeframe and a reduced 
strategic objective, namely to halt the advance of jihadist groups from northern Mali 
towards Bamako in order to rescue the Malian state from collapsing entirely. In time, 
however, the military intervention dragged France into an unanticipated strategic 
redeployment in Sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so, it replaced its initial aim of 
countering the advance of jihadist groups in northern Mali with the goal of fighting 
the jihadists affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in Operation Barkhane. In a 
document entitled “Qui est l’ennemi?” from 2016, the French Minister of Defence, 
Yves le Drian, explained that France’s strategy in Africa was to prioritize the fight 
against terrorism and jihadism in collaboration with the United States. In January 
2014, the French Minister of Defence announced that France would move “from a 
position inherited from decolonization, with large settlements, to the formation of 
more discrete projects oriented towards the fight against terrorism.”15 Later the same 
year, the Minister of Defence expressed satisfaction with the results of Operation 
Barkhane in Mali: “Mali has embarked upon a democratic process. Terrorist groups 
have withdrawn, even if there remains what we may call metastases.” The metaphor 
describing terrorism and jihadism as a cancer suggested that the beaten jihadist 
groups no longer threatened the existence of the Malian state, although a number 
of territories still had problems and were still contested. According to official 
statistics, between August 2014 and July 2017 the French forces neutralized more 
than 410 terrorists and seized more than 22 tons of weapons.16 According to the 
French Minister of Defence, Operation Barkhane had therefore succeeded in 
achieving two complementary objectives, namely: 
“ …the fight against terrorism and the support for the training of G5 
Sahel armies. On both objectives, the situation is progressing. France 
has trained more than 20,000 soldiers, and every day our joint attacks 
weaken the enemy. There is still a lot of groundwork to be done 
regarding equipment, which is why I wanted a real transfer policy 
ranging from training to delivery to maintenance. In the meantime, we 
will continue to evolve our country support system, just as we do with 
the deployment of Operational Assistance Liaison Detachments 
(DLAOs). These operations, conducted by the French army in 
collaboration with the national armies, show excellent results.17
  ” 
France’s military involvement in the Sahel is based on the idea that jihadist 
terrorism is neither an expression of socio-economic problems nor a consequence 
of France’s military interventionism. Rather, it is seen as the culmination of an 
ideological struggle between anti-democratic jihadists and democratic France, as 
also manifested in the recent attacks by jihadists in France itself. As such, it is also 
perceived to be the prelude to a war fought by jihadist groups against French 
democratic values. France’s engagement is based on the idea that reducing poverty 
in the Sahel would eliminate neither the extremists nor the jihadists. In consequence, 
French military operations prioritize the destruction of the human and material 
infrastructure of the jihadists as a means to reduce their capacity and ultimately 
eliminate them altogether. Only then will France be able to support the Sahel states 
in restoring their authority and putting in place development policies targeting the 
most abandoned regions.
French military operations prioritize the destruction of the 
human and material infrastructure of the jihadists as a means to 
reduce their capacity and ultimately eliminate them altogether.
While there are major challenges to the sustainability of the French security provision 
in the Sahel, including the continued inability of French and Malian forces to exercise 
control over the entirety of Malian territory and its population groups, Operations 
Serval and Barkhane have nevertheless ensured the survival of the Malian state over 
the past five years. 
A feasible objective?
However, the French military strategy in the Sahel raises a number of questions 
about objectives, financing and collaboration, starting with common definitions. Is 
jihadism, for instance, primarily an expression of ideology? And even if we agree that 
it is, will it be possible to defeat such an ideology by reducing the military and human 
capacities of its supporters? Experiences from elsewhere suggest the opposite, 
including experiences within the region. Although the French military operation in 
northern Mali has succeeded in halting the advance of the jihadists and even 
chasing them partly out of the region, it has not succeeded in halting the expansion 
of jihadism in the Sahel more generally. Indeed, over the past three years jihadism 
has expanding rapidly into previously untouched areas adjacent to northern Mali, 
42 EUROPE AND THE SAHEL-MAGHREB CRISIS EUROPE AND THE SAHEL-MAGHREB CRISIS 43
including the northern border regions of Burkina Faso and the regions in central Mali 
around Mopti. While the former separatists, the Coordination des Mouvements de 
l’Azawad coalition (CMA), the government and pro-government militias (Platforme) 
increasingly cooperate in implementing the Algiers Peace Accord, jihadist groups 
outside the peace agreement continue to mushroom, further undermining security 
within several Sahel states. The ongoing threat from jihadist groups was highlighted 
by the attack on the Operational Coordination Mechanism (OMC) in Gao, which is 
responsible for deploying mixed patrols, by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb linked 
to Al-Mourabitoun. Moreover, jihadist groups have announced the formation of a 
new alliance, the Group of Support for Islam and Muslims, which brings together 
four al-Qaida organizations and affiliates under one umbrella organization consisting 
of Ansar Dine (and its affiliate the Macina Liberation Front), Al Murabitun and al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’s Sahara battalion. Adding to the increasingly 
complex security environment in the Sahel, Boko Haram has stepped up its 
asymmetric attacks and expanded its operations into Chad and Niger following its 
loss of territory and operating bases in Nigeria. Recent events in Kidal also illustrate 
how French counterinsurgency operations may feed into local antagonisms against 
UN peacekeepers. On April 2016, after three French soldiers died in an IED explosion 
in Kidal, French forces increased arrests as part of their investigation of the event. 
In response to the arrests, Kidal residents protested and decided to storm the airport 
held by Uhe N’s peacekeeping force, MINUSMA. Such events galvanize support 
for the jihadist groups and serve to prove the latter’s narrative of the brutality to 
which Western colonial powers resort in order to protect their own interests. Hence, 
despite some remarkable military gains, the French counter-terrorist Operations 
Serval and Barkhane are stimulating the very challenges they are supposed to be 
overcoming. This is not just a question of providing ammunition for anti-western 
militant mobilization but, more directly, of supporting the illegitimate and often 
highly repressive governments of the Sahel region in imposing their will on their 
peripheries. In other words, the international military operation risks perpetuating 
the very root causes of the symptoms it is fighting. France may therefore risk sliding 
into the same type of endless “war against terror” that the American-led campaigns 
experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq during the first decade of the 2000s. 
The search for partners
Apart from defining the overall objectives for engagement, another key issue is 
finance: who will foot the bill for running the military operation in the Sahel? France 
does not have sufficient economic muscle to pay the costs alone, and as a conse-
quence it has sought to mobilize European budgetary support by presenting its 
military repression of jihadists in the Sahel not only as a means to protect French 
interests, but also as a tactical response to a common threat to the whole of Europe. 
As the former director of the Joint Defence College, General Vincent Desportes, put 
it in 2017: 
“ The Sahel must be the priority mission because we are responsible for 
it, and it is our close neighbour. Unlike Afghanistan, it is our war, a 
long-term military action that will require the support of local armies for 
a long time. The Sahel is not only a threat, but also a strategic asset. In 
the current state of the French armed forces, we should therefore 
focus on this mission. In the long term, we will have to reinvest in our 
defence at the height of security issues. Finally, the goal of the military 
engagement in the Sahel is only to create favourable conditions for the 
implementation of a political solution. The Sahel’s problems comprise 
the high growth in population and the lack of employment. It is time  
to build a truly global strategy, now missing, to move forward 
simultaneously on three lines of operation: security, governance and 
development. In Afghanistan, the coalition spent $1 trillion in vain, of 
which about $800 billion funded kerosene and bombs. This strategy 
can only be European, and the first partner to convince is Germany.18
  ” 
France has also tried to compensate for its overly prominent role in the military 
struggle against the jihadists by finding a regional partner in or around the Sahel. 
Francois Hollande initially tried to convince Algeria to fill this role, but in vain. While 
the Algerian President Bouteflika quietly allowed French fighter jets to refuel over 
Algerian air space without consulting parliament, the Algerian regime would not be 
lured into taking responsibility for the consequences of a military intervention that it 
had opposed and saw as disruptive of its own strategic interests in the Sahel and 
the Maghreb. As a consequence, Emmanuel Macron has more recently groomed 
Chad to become a key military ally, or what he refers to as “a leader of the new 
military architecture under construction”. According to Macron, Chad will be able to 
assist France in this endeavour by drawing on its seasoned and well-equipped army, 
which in 2013 proved its abilities by dislodging AQIM troops from the Adrar des 
Ifoghas, as well as in the struggle against Boko Haram in Nigeria. The overture to 
Chad seems to have created an opening, and the Chadian president later explained 
that, provided European countries supplied financial and military equipment, his 
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country would “be at the forefront of the fight against terrorism in the G5 space.” 
However, shortly afterwards the Chadian president also stated that his country had 
reached the limits of its capacity: “We cannot continue to be everywhere, in Niger, 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Mali, and monitor 1,200 kilometres of out border with Libya. All 
this is excessively expensive, and, if nothing is done, Chad will unfortunately be 
forced to withdraw.”19
Both the national governments involved in the G5-Sahel  
initiative and their international supporters recognize that a  
military response will remain insufficient to combat jihadism  
in the Sahel.
However, the main obstacle to France’s ability to secure substantial financial 
support for its engagement in the Sahel is linked to the fact that, while regional 
powers in North and East Africa and the Sahel seem to share France’s concerns 
over jihadist terrorism, and while European governments are well aware that 
jihadists have nothing good in store for them, European powers operate with an 
alternative and at present more compelling threat scenario when it comes to the 
Sahel. In Italy, Germany, the Balkans, Greece, Spain and a number of north and 
east European countries, migration is seen as a far more urgent problem than 
jihadist terrorism. That does not just leave France at risk of having to foot the 
majority of the bill for its military engagement in the Sahel; it also leaves it at risk of 
remaining the priority enemy number one of jihadists in Africa, and perhaps more 
broadly in the Middle East. The key strategic approach adopted by France in order 
to handle this situation has been to represent its military engagement as one 
component among others in the EU’s so-called “comprehensive approach” to 
security, development and diplomacy in the Sahel. 
The G5-Sahel initiative is the first regional military response mechanism to target 
the transnational threats posed by jihadists in the Sahel. Nonetheless, both the 
national governments involved in the G5-Sahel initiative and their international 
supporters recognize that a military response will remain insufficient to combat 
jihadism in the Sahel. Jihadist mobilization in the Sahel exploits a host of local, 
regional and global strains, and in particular it targets marginalized population 
groups who have for decades been abandoned by their governments, among others 
Tuaregs, Peuls, Toubou, Songhai and Haratins. While building social and family 
links with notable families in the region and intimidating opponents into passivity, 
jihadists also offer social and political answers to the problems felt by these groups. 
Hence they respond to the persistence of social injustice and the arbitrary exercise 
of power in rural parts of the Sahel with an offer to create a new state – the Islamic 
State – and a new equitable justice system based on the Sharia. In the face of 
ethnic rivalries, jihadists emphasise the importance of their common Muslim 
identity as a means of conflict resolution and arbitration.  
A successful response to the jihadist threat in the Sahel should therefore be based 
first on a shared understanding that jihadism poses a real threat to both the states 
in the Sahel and their European partners. Secondly, it must be based on an under-
standing that military solutions must go hand-in-hand with broader socio-economic, 
ideological-theological and social initiatives to support the weak and failing states 
of the Sahel in becoming providers of equitable justice, economic opportunities and 
political inclusion. 
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EUROPEAN ANTI-MIGRATION POLICY
In tandem with France’s efforts to suppress jihadists in the Sahel, over the past few 
years the European Union (EU) and its member states have engaged forcefully in 
curbing the migration flows out of the Sahel, notably those through Libya. This 
policy focus has come about as the result of a gradual adjustment. From an initial 
twentieth-century understanding of the Sahel as an object of French post-colonial 
interest and EU development assistance, the EU adopted its first so-called “Sahel 
strategy” only in 2011. This strategy, which adopted a security prism primarily in 
reaction to the proliferation of jihadist groups of North African origin like AQIM in 
Mali, Niger and Mauritania, introduced the EU’s so-called “comprehensive approach”. 
On the basis that security and development were mutually dependent, this combined 
more traditional development instruments with new security-oriented initiatives 
ranging from the capacity-building of law enforcement agencies to preventive 
measures against the proliferation of jihadist and other radical thinking and 
mobilization. Another key idea in the strategy was to invest in facilitating closer 
regional cooperation among the Sahel states, as well as between the Sahel region 
and neighbouring regions. In particular, the EU identified the need to bring the 
Maghreb states on board to address the challenges facing the Sahel countries, like 
poverty, food scarcity, drought, the youth bulge, corruption, weak governance, 
internal conflict, violent extremism, trafficking and terrorism: 
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“ Many of the challenges impact on neighbouring countries, including 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and even Nigeria, whose engagement is 
necessary to help resolve them. The current political developments in 
the Maghreb have consequences for the situation in the Sahel, taking 
into account close relations between the countries of the two regions, 
a significant presence of citizens of the Sahel countries in the Maghreb 
and the risks that arise from the proliferation of arms in the region.
  ” 
(SSDS 2011: 1).
A new concern 
It is possible that the weakening of state authority in several Maghreb countries in 
the wake of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 ended up undermining some of these initial 
ambitions for prioritizing closer regional integration between the Sahel and the 
Maghreb. In any case, a new concern among European policy-makers over the 
potential increase in undocumented migration from the Sahel and Sub-Saharan 
Africa through the weakened Maghreb countries and into southern Europe via the 
so-called “central Mediterranean migration route” would in the following years trump 
the initial aim of fostering increased Sahel-Maghreb integration and collaboration, 
as expressed in the 2011 strategy document. In particular, the inability of Libya’s 
militias and political parties to establish a functioning transitional government after 
Gaddafi’s fall in late 2011 would stir up increasing concerns in Europe about 
migration flows across the Mediterranean. In 2014-2015 the combination of a 
descent into civil war and confrontations between Libya’s major political parties and 
militias during the summer of 2014, which pressured African migrants hosted in 
Libya to move on towards Europe, and the overburdening of the refugee camps for 
Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey would push the migration 
issue to the forefront of European strategic thinking about the Sahel.
In April 2015, the Council of the EU adopted an amended five-year strategy for its 
engagement in the Sahel, the so-called “Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020”. In 
contrast to the Sahel Strategy of 2011, which focused on combating terrorism and 
its root causes, the Action Plan of 2015 introduced a new and stronger focus on 
countering undocumented migration and mobility in the Sahel without forgetting 
the fight against jihadists and terrorists. 
Framed as a prolongation and continuation of the Sahel Strategy of 2011 and its 
comprehensive approach to security and development, the EU identified three 
amended domains of action and concern related to migration: improving conditions 
and opportunities for young people in the Sahel; managing borders, migration 
and mobility; and combating trafficking and transnational organized crime. The 
fourth domain of concern remained preventing and countering radicalization and 
extremism.
The EU has replaced its push for the Maghreb countries  
to take responsibility in the Sahel with a strategy of  
strengthening the capacity and cooperation between the  
Sahel countries themselves.
The Action Plan also saw a decrease in the importance that the EU accords to 
bringing regional actors in the Maghreb into play when addressing the challenges 
and threats to European security and stability in the Sahel. Instead of providing 
concrete ideas and allocating funds to initiatives that could facilitate, lure or gently 
push regional powers in the Maghreb into playing a stronger role in addressing the 
crisis in the Sahel, the EU now states vaguely that it sees a need to “develop a 
common space for dialogue and cooperation between the EU, Maghreb and 
Sahel” (AP 2015: 10) and that relevant Commission services and the EEAS will 
therefore “explore ways to enhance the cooperation on a European/Maghreb/Sahel 
level, as well as with other relevant West African and neighbouring countries, on 
issues of common interest” (AP 2015: 7). 
The EU’s downscaling of its push for the Maghreb countries to take more resolute 
action to solve the multiple crises in the Sahel has been replaced by what looks like 
a strategy that on the one hand aims to reinforce Sahelian national states in 
controlling their own borders, populations and territories, while on the other hand 
aiming to generate horizontal, east-west regional security and economic integration 
among the Sahel countries. To mention but the most obvious example, the EU 
allocated funds for the French-guided initiative to create a new security and trade 
framework between Mauretania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, the so-called 
G5-Sahel. While Morocco has agreed to undertake a minor task under this initiative, 
Algeria reportedly remains sceptical of the new security framework and its possible 
boost to France’s geopolitical presence in the Sahel. 
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In any case, the core framework is one of French/European/Western direct support 
and finance that aims to enable the Sahel countries to handle their security threats 
in the future. As such, it reinstates the separation between the Sahel and Maghreb 
regions, rather than supporting their vertical integration. It thus enhances the push 
to reconfirm the colonial borders that continue to serve as a guiding principle in 
post-colonial nation-building strategies in both the Sahel and the Maghreb countries. 
Results and consequences 
It remains to be seen whether the EU’s attempts to reduce migration into Europe will 
succeed. However, scholars and experts have expressed doubts and pointed out 
that these initiatives and policies have so far made little progress: the migration 
pressure has remained historically high, with 170,000 migrants, primarily from Sub-
Saharan Africa, crossing the Mediterranean from the Maghreb in 2016 (compared 
to 30-40,000 annually during the first decade of the 2000s) and an equally high 
number being registered by the IMO for the early quarters of 2017. European 
attempts to seal off the Mediterranean, in combination with the collapse of the 
Libyan economy, has created increasingly perilous conditions for migrants inside 
Libya, as manifested most blatantly in the re-emergence of modern slavery condi-
tions for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa under the auspices of both the private 
militias and elements in the EU-supported Libyan government’s border forces. Illicit 
trafficking and criminal networks have been further boosted by the increase in the 
informal economy and smuggling dividends under pressure from local policing 
initiatives funded by the EU and its member states. This has stoked prices for 
assistance to migrants illegally crossing the Sahara and the Mediterranean.
Militarization of the Sahel may be slowing down migration  
towards North Africa currently, but it is unlikely to stop it.
While the European powers have drawn up advanced plans to obstruct the transit 
migration via Niger to Libya and further on to Europe, its projects to address the 
root causes of migration in the Sahel and the West African region seem less 
developed and less creative. In the absence of a credible state in Libya, the EU is 
currently focusing on putting the brakes on transit migration into the country. Yet, 
closing the Libyan-Niger corridor by military means, even if this unlikely project 
can be momentarily realized in such a vast region, remains a short-term solution. 
Though there are legitimate reasons for countering cross-border militant jihadism, 
along with the smuggling of arms and drugs and the trafficking of women, the 
forcible suppression of the ancient trans-Saharan routes may create more long-
term problems than it solves.  
First, the region, and especially the semi-nomadic peoples in the northern parts of 
the Sahel, need cross-border trade and mobility. There is a long history of trade and 
commerce between the countries, and the poor depend on mobility as a coping 
strategy. Secondly, when the Libyan economy bounces back – and oil production is 
soon expected to reach a million barrels per day – African migrants will be needed 
to rebuild the country. A strong and prosperous job market in Libya can take the 
migration pressure off Europe. Thirdly, enforcing security from the outside, especially 
on seminomadic peoples, is having a detrimental effect on their livelihoods and 
could generate further political instability. Fourthly, any growing focus on security 
and border control must take into account the beneficial effects of regional migration 
for development and regional integration. Effectively, the freedom of movement 
enshrined in the ECOWAS protocols now stops in Agadez. Finally, militarization of 
the Sahel may be slowing down migration towards North Africa currently, but it is 
unlikely to stop it. Reports suggest that new and more dangerous routes crossing 
even harsher terrain are currently opening up and putting migrant lives at risk.    
The EU therefore faces a need to develop ways of integrating an African labour force 
into the receiving countries that contributes positively to growth and public finances, 
especially in countries where the population is aging. It should also be remembered 
that the resulting remittances are a stabilizing factor for the sending countries in 
both alleviating poverty and insulating weak economies, like Mali’s, against external 
shocks. Secondly, in order to manage migrants’ movements, Europe must invest in 
better family planning, health, education and job opportunities. Managed the right 
way, the World Bank argues, Africa’s demographic development may lead to a 
positive transition capable of becoming a window of opportunity for the impoverished 
region. The EU must not just focus on stopping people from moving, but also on 
giving people reasons to stay at home, or at least to migrate within the growing 
economies of the African continent alone. More roads to progress on the African 
continent are needed, not fewer. In fact, economic growth and meaningful youth 
employment is probably the strongest and most lasting source of security when it 
comes to preventing radicalization, as well as with regard to high-risk migration to 
Europe, whereas fencing in the continent could have the opposite effect.
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DENMARK IN THE SAHEL
In recent decades Denmark has built up a strong track record as a relatively 
important donor country in the three central Sahel states, Mali, Niger and Burkina 
Faso, in two of which it also has embassies. Over the past decade, this involvement 
with development has also been complemented by a number of security and 
stabilization efforts, including troop deployments to the UN force (MINUSMA) in 
Mali and allocations of funding for activities in the Sahel as part of the 2012 and 
2017 stabilization funds. Developed as an “integrated” approach to development 
and security in the Sahel, this aligns well with the EU’s “comprehensive” strategic 
approach. 
When in June 2017 the Danish government launched a new Foreign and Security 
Policy Strategy, the Sahel figured among the key security challenges that Denmark 
would prioritize in the coming years. In alignment with the EU Action Plan of 2015, 
for the first time ever the Danish strategy identified the reduction of migration from 
Africa and the Middle East as its top priority, and it also restated its goal of combating 
terrorism in Africa and the Middle East. This came well before the emergence of 
foreign policy issues like Brexit, the challenges to the EU framework and to economic 
globalization, and Denmark’s role in the Arctic. Among the twelve pledges made in 
the strategic document to enhance Denmark’s security and stability, seven were 
directly related to handling the crises in the Sahel. The government made strategic 
pledges to continue contributing to the military suppression of jihadists in Africa 
and the Middle East and prioritized countering the negative effects of drought and 
population growth in the Sahel. It also promised to strengthen its system for the 
readmission of rejected asylum-seekers and made pledges to increase investments 
to create opportunities for young and women in Africa. It promised to continue to 
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promote good governance and economic growth in North Africa and the Middle 
East, and to increase its contribution to the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya 
(EUBAM). Finally it promised to expand the capacities of the Ministry itself by 
creating migration-related positions at key embassies (e.g. in Nairobi) and appointing 
a special envoy to the Sahel and Maghreb.
In its current programming, Danish development assistance in the Sahel is imple-
menting these strategic priorities in the form of four general domains of engagement: 
security, migration, growth and governance.  
In the security domain, Danish assistance is targeting internally displaced people, 
refugees and local communities and is contributing to countering refugee pressures 
through strengthened protection and improved livelihoods, education and employ-
ment opportunities. Denmark also aims to foster peace-building and state-building 
on several levels, from capacitating public institutions in local communities to 
central institutions nationally, and also involving civil society, including faith-based 
organizations and the business sector, as important participants. In Mali, for 
instance, this includes engagements in reconciliation and conflict meditation and 
efforts to decentralize the government and boost its legitimacy. In Niger, Denmark 
supports accountability and inclusive governance, alongside civil-society organi-
zations. In Burkina Faso, Danish initiatives are targeting local access to justice and 
improved public financial management, as well as fighting organized crime through 
the instruments developed by the UN.
Current French, European and Danish foreign and security  
policies in the Sahel aim to consolidate state capacities in  
the Sahel and facilitate local security collaboration in the  
G5-Sahel framework.
Within the domain of migration, Denmark is seeking to counter irregular economic 
migration and is addressing its root causes by enabling sustainable development, 
protection and human rights for the benefit of both local communities and displaced 
people. In Niger, for instance, Denmark is planning to initiate more specific migration-
related activities in parallel with efforts to support the combatting of organized 
crime and border management.
In the growth domain, Denmark is seeking to invest in inclusive (i.e. pro-poor) and 
sustainable growth in the energy, water, agriculture and food sectors. In particular, it 
is seeking to support activities leading to decent job creation, entrepreneurship, 
innovation and the growth of micro-enterprises and SMEs. In Mali, for instance, 
Denmark aims to support private-sector growth and development and to counter 
Mali’s vulnerability to climate change, while in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it is 
supporting agricultural growth and development. 
The ability of European policies to reduce and eventually 
curb migration out of Africa into Europe is questionable.
Finally, Denmark is working within the domain of governance to improve basic 
freedoms, democracy, human rights and gender equality with a particular focus on 
sexual and reproductive health and the rights of women and girls. Furthermore, it is 
also seeking to counter the spread of violent extremism and radicalization by 
supporting inter-faith dialogue, education and job creation, as well as preventive 
initiatives targeting youth groups and developing the capacity of local authorities. 
In Mali, for instance, Denmark aims to support the spread of human rights and 
co-existence, stability and security. It is also seeking to promote human rights in 
Burkina Faso. In Niger, it supports the management of demographic growth through 
programmes aiming to enhance women’s sexual and reproductive rights.
It is, of course, still too early to assess whether these new initiatives will deliver on 
the strategic priorities or not. Given the close overlap with the EU’s priorities, it is 
relatively safe to assume that the concerns expressed by scholars and experts 
about the effects of these initiatives being implemented within the EU framework 
also apply to the Danish efforts.
The current French, European and Danish foreign and security policies in the Sahel 
seem implicitly to be targeting two overall outcomes: first, the consolidation of state 
capacities and the stabilization of their societies; and secondly, facilitating local 
security collaboration by horizontally integrating the five key countries in the Sahel 
into the G5-Sahel framework.
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It is a fair assumption to make that achieving these two strategic objectives in the 
future would benefit the EU and its member states. It would create structures and 
actors capable of preventing jihadists and migrants from threatening European 
stability and security through their own efforts. By boosting cooperation on border 
security and counterterrorism among the Sahel states, Europe would be granted the 
opportunity to re-adopt the role of donor, supporter and trainer of national authorities 
and regional institutions in the Sahel, which would then hunt down jihadists, be able 
to control their territories and limit the movement of migrants. 
As we have seen, however, it is also at least uncertain whether the current policies 
are having this result. While France’s military engagement in the Sahel since 2013 
may have saved Mali from a full state collapse, the campaigns to counter jihadism 
are being challenged, with mixed results. Aside from the question of whether these 
activities are targeting the correct drivers behind the mobilization (ideology rather 
than local power struggles, poverty, foreign military intervention etc.), the results are 
worrying: apart from the areas of northern Mali where French troops are present 
and active alongside MINUSMA, the UN-peacekeeping force, jihadist mobilization is 
spreading rapidly across the Sahel from Niger through central Mali to Burkina Faso 
and beyond. France may therefore be in for a very long, if not endless war against 
jihadism. Although it may have the stamina to shoulder the losses in human lives 
that any such operation will demand over the years, it does not currently have the 
financial capacity to foot the bill. 
The ability of European policies to reduce and eventually curb migration out of Africa 
into Europe is also questionable. The continuing high numbers of arrivals of African 
migrants on European shores suggest that effective border control mechanisms 
are not in place. At the same time, the blatant abuses suffered by African migrants 
on their way to Europe constitute a challenge to the moral foundations of these 
European border policies. As long as the criminalization of migration remains the 
go-to model for European policy-makers, illegal trafficking, which originally emerged 
in response to the closure of legal migration opportunities, is likely to continue to 
blossom and boost both the informal economy and the dividends of smugglers and 
criminals.
 
 CONCLUSION: FACILITATING TRANS-REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
This report has shown that a new perception has arisen among European and North 
African decision-makers of a series of threats and challenges emerging from the 
inability of states in the Sahel region to adequately address the growing activity and 
pressure from transnational non-state actors, in particular from jihadist groups and 
migrants. 
In defiance of the attempts made over the past century by colonial and post-colonial 
state-builders in the Sahel and North Africa to separate the two regions, jihadists 
and migrants are today pushing them closer together. 
This new reality of increased security interconnectedness between the Sahel, the 
Maghreb and Europe is the product a combination of long-term structural under-
development and a series of conjunctures in regional politics, ranging from state 
weaknesses to rivalry and paralysis among the regional powers. 
European foreign policy strategies, ranging from the strategic documents elaborated 
by the EU’s foreign service to the policies of a small Scandinavian member state like 
Denmark, has adequately diagnosed the lack of trans-regional integration and colla-
boration across the Sahara between the more powerful North African states and the 
less consolidated Sahel counterparts. This is a key factor responsible for generating 
these challenges and threats. 
Nevertheless, the current foreign policy responses of the EU and its member states 
tend to work against this. In the wake of the relative weakening of the capabilities of 
several of the most prominent North African powers during and after the Arab 
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Uprisings of 2011 – including a full state collapse in Libya – the European powers 
have all but abandoned their commitment to push for trans-regional integration 
across the Sahara. Instead, they have engaged in short-term tactical moves aiming 
to produce a minimum of stabilization by handling the immediate threats to 
European interests, from support for the toppling of Gaddafi in 2011 through the 
French and UN’s military efforts to suppress jihadists and stabilize Mali and its 
surroundings in 2013 to the latest efforts to boost regional security integration 
among the Sahel states under the umbrella of the G5-Sahel platform. 
Engaging regional powerhouses
There is an obvious need to continue the current efforts to combat jihadists, control 
migration and build states and regional integration in the Sahel. However, at the 
same time, the EU and its member states should recognize the limited strategic 
reach of such efforts and consider complementing them with a deeper push that 
reignites the ambition set out in European strategic documents prior to the Arab 
uprisings of turning North African powerhouses into partners in handling the 
challenges of migration, jihadism, and underdevelopment and under-performance 
in the states in the Sahel. In spite of the obstacles that any such effort will encounter 
from unwilling and suspicious states used to zero-sum thinking about power 
relations in the region, the EU and its member states have no alternative. Experiences 
from other world regions, including Southeast Asia and the Middle East, indicate 
that, in cases where global super-powers are increasingly disinclined to bid for 
regional hegemony, long-term stabilization and peace creation depend on regional 
great powers, whether Iran or Pakistan or, in the Sahel region, Algeria, Morocco and 
also, but perhaps in a slightly longer perspective, Egypt.
As stated in the EU’s own “Sahel Strategy” from 2011, it is hard to imagine that the 
current crises over migration and jihadism and their impact on European security 
and stability can be adequately solved without the strong involvement of the regional 
economic and security great powers in the Maghreb. Whether we are focusing on 
security provision, reducing migration, economic development or border controls, 
the EU and its member states like France might be able to foot the bill and sustain 
the pressure from losses of human lives under the current forms of engagement, 
both initially and for some time into the future. However, it seems unlikely that any 
of these actors will be able to do so in the long run. Dividing the task with the regional 
powers in the Maghreb would permit Europe to share both the security risks and the 
economic burden of handling the crises in the Sahel. 
The genuine involvement of both Algeria and Morocco in this endeavour would 
simultaneously limit the risks of spoiler politics being enacted by the partner that 
seems least likely to gain from European-engineered regional politics; for the time 
being, that state is Algeria. Equally, the solution to the migration challenge is neither 
to open nor to close the doors to Europe completely. The current criminalization of 
emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa into both the Maghreb and Europe does little 
to find long-term solutions to the problem of surplus labour and the ensuing 
emigration pressure being transferred from the Sahel into Europe. The involvement 
of the Maghreb powers – in particular Morocco and Algeria, but in time also Tunisia 
and Libya – in absorbing the migration pressure on Europe by opening legal 
“circular” or “seasonal” labour immigration from the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa 
would help alleviate the current pressures on the Central Mediterranean migration 
route.
There are several concrete steps that the EU and its member states could consider 
to kick-start the move towards opening up increased trans-regional integration 
between the Sahel and North Africa.
Promoting circular migration
Within the spectrum of its migration policy, the EU and its member states could 
consider downscaling their push to seal off the borders between the two regions. 
Instead, they could launch programs to encourage and legalize the type of cross-
regional “circular” or “seasonal” labour migration between the Sahel and the Maghreb 
known in past decades through targeted investments in local economies and job 
creation in North Africa to help absorb the surplus labour that is expected to emerge 
in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa over the coming decades. 
Increased security cooperation on the regional level
Within the domain of security, European powers could consider reducing their 
efforts to include both Morocco and Algeria – and ideally also Egypt – in the security 
cooperation of the G5-Sahel. The current support from Morocco but not Algeria is a 
recipe for generating spoiler dynamics further down the road, and with it, eventually, 
long-term failure. In particular, the EU could increase its efforts to link Algeria to the 
G5-Sahel platform, for example, by identifying ways of merging the CEMOC regional 
security platform with the newly established G5-Sahel security structure. It could 
also seek ways to facilitate practical hands-on security collaboration between 
sovereign neighbouring countries based on the model developed by Tunisia and 
Algeria in their anti-terrorism efforts in the regions bordering Libya. 
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Denmark, a possible facilitator 
Much of the above will obviously be left to the work of the great powers. Nonetheless, 
small European powers like Denmark may have an important role to play in this 
process as well. Given that no other European actors are currently pushing seriously 
to increase trans-regional integration between the Maghreb and the Sahel, a country 
like Denmark could find itself with a prominent role to play in this process, possibly 
in cooperation with its other Nordic partners. 
Denmark enjoys a relatively sober reputation and a high level of credibility among 
governments and populations in the Sahel and North Africa alike. While some of 
the more recent positioning of Denmark on the international scene – including 
the government’s aim to profile Denmark as a particularly unattractive European 
country for immigration from the Global South– Denmark’s long-term and 
comparatively large involvement in stabilization efforts, humanitarian assistance 
and both economic and political development in the Sahel provides a good basis for 
such diplomatic efforts. Denmark also enjoys good relations with key North African 
players like Algeria and Morocco, as well as good working relationships with both of 
the major international security providers in the two regions, France and the US. For 
this reason, and preferably in cooperation with like-minded powers, Denmark could 
act as a neutral mediator, convenor or “facilitator” of cross-regional meetings and 
dialogue between Sahelian, North African and European powers in order to bring the 
region’s partners together. Strategically, such an effort would also be aligned with 
Denmark’s long-term goals. Given that Denmark’s most recent defence and foreign 
policy strategy has led to the appointment of a Special Envoy for the Sahel and 
Maghreb tasked with facilitating the coordination of issues related to solving the 
crisis in the Sahel and its implications for Europe, the Danish government has no 
need to create a new instrument to carry out this task. Moreover, the complementary 
decision to open an embassy in Algeria alongside its representations in Morocco, 
Mali and Burkina Faso also means that Denmark is relatively well equipped to 
provide diplomatic support to such commitments. 
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